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Abstract
Studies on the economic consequences of internal political violence typically find
negative short-run effects that are not very large, and no evidence for full economic
recovery. We study the impact of the Rwandan genocide in 1994 on economic
development using the synthetic control method. We find a 58 percent decrease
in GDP in 1994, and strong evidence that Rwanda’s economy was then catching
up with the estimated counterfactual GDP it would have had in the absence of
the genocide, with the gap closing after 17 years. The negative effects were more
pronounced in the industry and service sectors than in agriculture.
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1 Introduction
Civil conflicts and other forms of internal political violence were common in the second
half of the last century (Blattman and Miguel, 2010); and nowadays the news are again
dominated by reports on civil conflicts in a diverse set of countries, including countries
in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Given the
ubiquity of civil conflicts, it is surprising how little we know about the short- and long-run
effects of civil conflicts on a country’s economic development. Economic theory provides
limited guidance. Standard neoclassical growth models predict relatively fast growth in
the first years after civil conflict when the economy is still far below its steady state,
and fully recovery in the long run (Solow, 1956). Alternative theoretical models however
imply that major political violence may tip countries into poverty traps (Azariadis and
Drazen, 1990).
The empirical literature on the economic consequences of civil conflicts started with the
cross-country growth study by Collier (1999). In a more recent and similarly prominent
cross-country growth study, Cerra and Saxena (2008) find that civil conflicts cause GDP
to drop by six percent on average, and that GDP only partially rebounds in the medium-
to long-run. A concern with cross-country growth studies is that, due to data availability,
countries with small-scale events and fast recoveries are more likely to be in the sample
than countries with large-scale political violence and a potentially chaotic experience in
the aftermath. This sample selection bias may lead to an underestimation of the negative
short-run effects, and an overestimation of the speed of recovery. The recent empirical
contributions by, e.g., Rogall and Yanagizawa-Drott (2013), Rohner et al. (2013), and
Serneels and Verpoorten (2013) compare the economic consequences of internal political
violence across different regions of a conflict-torn country that have experienced different
degrees of violence. These within-country studies all provide interesting insights, but by
design they cannot inform us about the country-wide (or average) short- and long-term
consequences of major political violence.
Our study contributes to the literature on the economic consequences of internal po-
litical violence by focusing on the country-wide short- and long-run economic effects of
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the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. This genocide has been one of the most intense events
of political violence since World War II. During a period of approximately 100 days, ex-
tremists of the Hutu majority slaughtered around 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus.
In addition, there was an exodus of at least two million refugees (UNHCR, 2000).
The main challenge for estimating the effect of violent events in a single country is
to find the appropriate counterfactual development, i.e., the hypothetical development
of Rwanda’s economy had it not experienced the genocide. We use the synthetic control
method exactly because it allows determining an appropriate counterfactual development.
This method was pioneered by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) in a study on the economic
costs of terrorism in the Basque country, and further refined by Abadie et al. (2010,
2015), who apply it to study the counterfactual development of states and countries.1 In
the context of the Rwandan genocide, this method allows the construction of a synthetic
Rwanda as a counterfactual that is composed of countries from a donor pool of other Sub-
Saharan African countries. The synthetic control method uses pre-genocide information
of the developmental outcome of interest and additional economic and political predictors
that are important determinants of the outcome to construct the synthetic Rwanda that
develops as similar as possible as the true Rwanda prior to the genocide. The short- and
long-run economic effects of the Rwandan genocide can then be estimated by comparing
the development of the true and the synthetic Rwanda.
We find that the Rwandan genocide led to an immediate drop in GDP by 58 percent.
Taking into account the death toll suggests that GDP per survivor dropped by 53 percent.
Further taking into account the exodus of refugees suggests that GDP per survivor staying
in Rwanda still dropped by 31 percent. The Rwandan economy has since been catching up
with the synthetic Rwanda. However it took around 17 years until its GDP was equal to
its counterfactual GDP, which it would have experienced in the absence of the genocide.
When looking at the development of the various sectors, we find an interesting and, as
we argue below, reasonable pattern: Value added in agriculture dropped less than value
added in industry and services, and it also rebounded more quickly to its counterfactual
1Other recent applications using the synthetic control method to determine a country’s counterfactual
development include Billmeier and Nannicini (2013), and Cavallo et al. (2013).
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level.
While our paper contributes to the entire literature on the short- and long-term eco-
nomic consequences of internal political violence, it is of course particularly close to pre-
vious contributions focusing on the Rwandan genocide. Like us, Lopez and Wodon (2005)
also study at the effect on the country’s GDP. There are three main differences between
their study and ours. First, they use a methodology for the identification and correction
of outliers in time series while we use the synthetic control method. The main advantage
of our approach is that the synthetic control method can account for post-genocide events
that affected Rwanda, and that would have affected Rwanda even if the genocide had
never occurred, which is difficult when solely relying on time series information. Second,
Lopez and Wodon (2005) find no evidence for convergence, while we find strong evidence
that Rwanda’s GDP has caught up successfully.2 Third, we also study how the effects
differ across sectors. Complementarily, the aforementioned contributions of Rogall and
Yanagizawa-Drott (2013), and Serneels and Verpoorten (2013) study how the intensity of
the violence experienced during the genocide affects today’s living standards.3
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the methodol-
ogy, section 3 the data, and section 4 our findings. Section 5 briefly concludes.
2 Methodology
The synthetic control method was first used by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and
further developed by Abadie et al. (2010, 2015). This method generalizes the idea of
difference-in-differences in several ways and has been tailored for the analysis of case
studies where both the treated and the control group may be very small. Studying the
economic impact of the genocide in Rwanda, we make use of country-level panel data
which leaves us with the country exposed to the treatment, i.e., the genocide in 1994, and
a control group, called donor pool, which consists of all Sub-Saharan African countries
2This difference in results is due to the different methods applied as well as the fact that we can use
ten more years of data.
3See Verpoorten (2014) for a broader, more descriptive discussion of growth, poverty and inequality
in Rwanda.
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(for which data is available). We however exclude Rwanda’s neighboring countries, i.e.,
Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tanzania, and Uganda. These countries
have been affected by the genocide as well, e.g., through the exodus of refugees and the
subsequent involvement of Rwandan forces in conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo.
The main idea behind the synthetic control method is to use countries included in the
donor pool, which have not been exposed to the treatment, to build the counterfactual
development for Rwanda in the post-treatment period. This method accounts for the fact
that different countries share a different degree of similarity with Rwanda by using country
weights ωd for each country d in the donor pool, with 0 ≤ ωd ≤ 1 and
D∑
d=1
ωd = 1. To find
the best possible synthetic Rwanda among all the possible combinations of countries in the
donor pool it uses pre-treatment information of the outcome of interest Yt and additional
predictors Zt that are important determinants of Yt. In particular, the synthetic Rwanda is
estimated by choosing weights ωd such that Yt−
D∑
d=1
ω∗dYdt and Zt−
D∑
d=1
ω∗dZdt are minimized
for the years prior to the treatment, i.e., in our case for t < 1994. The treatment effect
αt is then calculated as αt = Yt −
D∑
d=1
ω∗dYdt for t ≥ 1994 (Abadie et al., 2010, 2015).
By applying the synthetic control method one does not obtain classical standard errors
to make judgments about the statistical significance of the treatment effect αt. Instead,
one can rely on placebo studies (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003). That is, one runs the
same analysis for the other countries in the donor pool, which are not exposed to the
treatment, and then compares the resulting αdt for each placebo with the original αt. A
treatment effect may then only be considered as being significantly different from 0 if it
is larger than the “treatment effects” obtained from the placebos.
However, placebos typically also result in large αdt if the fit between the synthetic
donor country and the actual donor country is poor, i.e., if the pre-treatment root mean
square prediction errors (RMSPE) are high. Consequently, the main inference approach
used below is based on a refinement of the placebo studies. In particular, we take two
additional measures: First, we exclude placebos with very high pre-treatment RMSPE
to minimize the influence of outliers. We do so based on a simple rule: We exclude all
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placebos for which the pre-treatment RMSPE is larger than the median plus one standard
deviation in the sample.4
Second, we based our inference analysis on the RMSPE ratios, i.e., the ratios be-
tween the prediction error (or RMSPE) for individual post-treatment years and the pre-
treatment RMSPE (Abadie et al., 2010, 2015). The RMSPE ratios allow comparing the
size of the treatment effects relative to the quality of the fit. High RMSPE ratios for the
treated country relative to the countries from the donor pool indicate that the treatment
effect is exceptional given the pre-treatment fit, or, in other words, that it is unlikely that
one would obtain a similar effect by randomly assigning the treatment to a non-treated
country from the donor pool. We indicate the share of countries in the donor pool for
which we got a higher RMSPE ratio in our main figures (in parenthesis below the treat-
ment effects). These share or probabilities, respectively, allow assessing the statistical
significance of the treatment effects.
In addition to the placebo studies based on countries in the donor pool, we also conduct
placebo studies in time. That is, we apply the synthetic control method under the false
assumption that the genocide already happened in 1985 instead of the actual occurrence
in 1994. The underlying idea is that there should be no treatment effect happening before
the actual treatment. Finding an effect for the placebos in time would therefore invalidate
any effect found in the core analysis. However, the results for all four dependent variables
in our analysis turn out to be negligible and therefore do not invalidate the treatment
effects found in the core analysis (see Figure 2 and Figure A.3 in the Appendix).
3 Data
The main outcome variable, GDP, is real GDP at chained PPPs from Penn World Table
(PWT) 8.0. Further outcome variables are the value added in agriculture, industry and
4A reason for excluding outliers is that placebos with high pre-treatment RMSPE usually show a
high fake treatment effect which is increasing over time. There are more sophisticated methods to detect
outliers in the literature. However, our simple rule proves to be a very effective criteria in our setting
where we only want to exclude extreme outliers on one side of the distribution. Figure 2 (left graph)
shows the placebo study for GDP which serves as the basis for calculating the pre-treatment RMSPE.
Only one placebo has been detected as outlier and therefore been removed (see also Figure 1).
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services in constant USD from the World Development Indicators (WDI).5
We use different types of economic and political predictors when looking at GDP and
value added in industry and services: The human capital index from PWT 8.0, which is
based on years of schooling and an estimate of the rate of return; the investment share of
GDP at constant prices from PWT 7.1; openness defined as exports plus imports divided
by GDP at constant prices from PWT 7.1; inflation defined as the annual change in the
GDP deflator from WDI; the Polity2 score from Polity IV, which measures the democratic
quality of political institutions; the political rights rating from Freedom House; and a
variable indicating the number of civil conflict/war events in a particular country and year
from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). In addition, we also use average daily
temperature and precipitation from the Climatic Research Unit (CRU), and information
on the production of meat, cereals, pulses, vegetables and fruits in tonnes from the Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) when looking at value added in agriculture. For most
of these predictors we use the average values over the years 1985–1990. There are two
exceptions: First, for the conflict variable, we additionally use the average over the years
1991–1993 due to the conflict events in Rwanda in the three years prior to the genocide.
Second, for temperature and precipitation, we use the average not only over the years
1985–1990, but also over the post-treatment years, as temperature and precipitation are
exogenous.
Moreover, we use population data from PWT 8.0, and gross production value for coffee
and tea from the FAO.6 Table 1 presents summary statistics.
Table 1 around here
5We choose PWT as the source for the GDP data as this has a strong positive impact on the sample
size. However, data for value in agriculture, industry and services is only available from WDI.
6In the Appendix, we use the gross production value for coffee and tea to study the impact of the
genocide on tea and coffee production. Due to very limited data availability, we only use temperature
and precipitation as additional predictors for tea and coffee production (plus the civil conflicts variable
for coffee).
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4 Results
Figure 1 presents the estimated effects of the Rwandan genocide on Rwanda’s economic
development. The graph shows the GDP of the true (solid line) and the synthetic (dashed
line) Rwanda from 1970 to 2011. The prediction error is reasonably small as indicated
by the almost overlapping lines for the period up to 1993. The estimated effect of the
genocide corresponds to the difference between the GDP of the true and the synthetic
Rwanda from 1994 onwards. The numbers underneath the solid line in Figure 1 indicate
this difference for all post-genocide years and the corresponding statistical significance in
parenthesis. The value after D (bottom left) corresponds to the number of outliers in the
placebo study that have been dropped. In this case only one country/placebo has been
dropped form the inference analysis. Consequently, N refers to the number of countries
included in the placebos study, and RMSPE stands for the root mean squared prediction
error.
Figure 1 around here
The estimates show that the genocide reduced GDP by 58 percent in 1994. Rwanda’s
total population was 7.1 million in 1991 according to the Second Rwanda General Census
of Population and Housing. Hence, GDP per capita dropped by around 53 percent if we
take the 800,000 deaths into account, and still by around 31 percent if we take moreover
into account that two million fled the country.7 The estimates further show that Rwanda
has been steadily catching up to the counterfactual GDP since 1994. At some point
between the years 2001 and 2002 the negative effect of the genocide became around half
as large as it was in 1994. Finally, in 2011, Rwanda’s GDP coincided with the GDP of the
synthetic Rwanda, suggesting that Rwanda’s GDP was no longer any lower than it would
have been in the absence of the genocide. Hence, Rwanda’s economy fully recovered from
7When applying the synthetic control method to GDP per capita rather than total GDP, the estimates
imply that the genocide reduced GDP per capita by 51 percent in 1994. Generally, we are however hesitant
to trust results using per capita time series because estimated time series for population are all extremely
smooth. While around 11 percent of Rwanda’s population was killed in a short period of time, the effect
of the genocide is smoothed over five years in the estimated population time series (see Figure A.1 in the
Appendix).
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the genocide after around 17 years.8
Figure 2 presents two types of placebo studies. The left graph shows the effects for all
the 22 other countries in the donor pool. We see that the difference between the countries’
true and synthetic GDP was larger for Rwanda than for all countries in the donor pool
in the first years from 1994 onwards, which is what one would expect given that these
countries were not hit by such a large negative shock as a genocide. The right graph shows
the development of the true and the synthetic Rwanda when preponing the treatment to
1985. As expected, we see absolutely no effect.
Figure 2 around here
The statistical significance of the treatment effects reports in Figure 1 is based on
placebo studies for the 22 Sub-Saharan African countries in the donor pool. The values
of 0.00 for the years 1994 to 1996 indicates that the difference between the countries’ true
and synthetic GDP remains larger for Rwanda than for all countries in the donor pool
during these years even if we condition on the pre-treatment fit. Given the economic and
political volatility of many Sub-Saharan African countries, it is not surprising that the
statistical significance falls quickly over time. For the years 1997 and 1998 we already find
two countries in the donor pool with a larger absolute difference between the true and the
synthetic GDP than Rwanda. Hence, the probability to assess the statistical significance
of the effect for Rwanda becomes 2/22=0.09 in 1997. From 1999 onwards, this probability
exceeds 10 percent, which is a common level of significance in cross-country studies, but
remains reasonably close to 10 percent for at least two more years.
Figures 3–5 present the results for valued added in agriculture, industry and services,
respectively.9 The reduction in value added in 1994 was 40 percent in agriculture, 66
percent in industry, and 59 percent in services. Moreover, the process of catching up with
the counterfactual value added lasted around 8 years in agriculture, 13 years in industry,
8The notes to Figure 1 indicate that Cameroon has a large weight in the construction of the synthetic
Rwanda. Figure A.2 in the Appendix presents the estimated effects after excluding Cameroon from the
donor pool. The results remain very similar.
9Figure A.3 in the Appendix presents the same placebo tests as Figure 2, but for valued added in
agriculture, industry and services rather than GDP.
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and 17 years in services.10 These results suggest that agriculture was less severely hit by
the genocide than the other sectors, and recovered much more quickly.
Figures 3, 4 and 5 around here
We can think of various possible reasons for these heterogeneous effects across sectors:
First, people probably give highest priority to subsistence consumption needs and, there-
fore, agricultural production during and after such dramatic events. This priority may
explain both the smaller initial decline in agricultural production and the faster recovery
thereafter. Second, Rwanda was (and still is) very densely populated and most people
were working in agriculture. The negative effects on agricultural output per capita are
even seen as a major cause of the genocide (Prunier, 2005). Therefore, it is no surprise
that a large drop in the population did not have a strong and lasting negative effect on
value added in agriculture. In the industry and service sectors, labor productivity was
probably much higher (e.g., Caselli, 2005), such that a drop in the workforce had more
negative effects. Third, de Walque and Verwimp (2010) find that more educated citizens
were more likely to die during the genocide. The disproportional loss of educated citizens
probably hit agriculture less severely than the industry and service sectors, which are
more reliant on skilled workers.
Figure 3 suggests one further interesting finding: Rwanda’s value added in agriculture
did not only catch up relatively quickly, but was even 20 to 50 percent above its coun-
terfactual value from 2006 onwards. To further investigate this effect, we study the two
most important agricultural products for Rwanda in terms of exports, Tea and Coffee
(see Figure A.4 in the Appendix). The effects on the production value of tea look like the
effect on agricultural value added except that the effects on tea are substantially larger.
In 1994, the production value of tea decreased by 69 percent compared to the counterfac-
tual. However, the production value exceeds its counterfactual from 2006 onwards, and
does so by more than 100 percent in 2011. We also find a dramatic short-run effect on
10While the true Rwanda’s value added in agriculture and services stayed above the corresponding
values of the synthetic Rwanda after having caught up, the same is not true for value added in industry:
The synthetic Rwanda’s value added in industry has again been higher than the true Rwanda’s value in
the most recent years.
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the production value of coffee with a decrease of close to 100 percent in the year of the
genocide. Since then the production value for coffee has been steadily catching up with
its counterfactual. Given the relatively moderate initial effect on the agricultural sector
as a whole (relative to industry and services), and the drastic effects on the agricultural
export goods tea and coffee, we suspect that the focus has been on subsistence farming in
the aftermath of the genocide. This suspicion is in line with the rather moderate increase
in undernourishment after the genocide.11
5 Concluding Remarks
We have employed the synthetic control method to study the short- and long-term eco-
nomic consequences of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, which has been one of the the
most intense events of political violence since World War II. We find a large negative effect
on economic performance in the short run. In particular, we estimate that GDP dropped
by 58 percent below its counterfactual level in 1994. Looking at the long run we find
that full recovery to the counterfactual level of development is possible and happened in
Rwanda after 17 years. Our analysis therefore challenges two findings from cross-country
growth studies. First, the negative short-run effects can be much higher than the average
effects found in cross-country growth studies. This insight may not be surprising as coun-
tries with large-scale events tend to be under-represented in cross-country growth studies.
The second difference is more upbeat in that we show that even countries suffering from
very intense internal political violence can fully recover – at least in economic terms. This
finding is consistent with standard neoclassical growth models (e.g., Solow, 1956).
In addition, we show that the magnitude of the short-run effect and the speed of re-
covery are both sector-specific. In case of Rwanda the drop in agricultural production
was smaller and recovery was faster in agriculture than in the industry and service sec-
tors. Arguably, the relatively fast recovery in agriculture may have been an important
prerequisite for the recovery of the entire economy.
11Data on undernourishment is available from the FAO from 1992 onwards, but only as 3-year averages.
Undernourishment was around 56 percent in the 3 years prior to the genocide, and around 64 percent in
the three years thereafter.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N Source
GDP1 18687.34 44364.65 96.69 426762.59 1680 PWT
Openess 71.06 36.77 10.08 217.14 1600
Human Capital 1.67 0.41 1.04 2.85 1176
Investment 20.89 12.57 -33.14 85.17 1600
Population2 10.88 19 0.07 162.47 1680
VA Agriculture1 841.32 1147.55 9.29 7422.31 1320 WDI
VA Industry1 2003.27 6481.84 8.02 49513.01 1278
VA Services1 4544.25 14616.57 52.16 122639.28 936
Inflation 23.02 187.56 -33.79 5399.53 1531
Political Rights 5.05 1.81 1 7 1535 FH
Polity2 -2.32 5.99 -10 10 1498 Polity IV
Conflicts 0.12 0.36 0 3 1620 UCDP
Meat3 139.16 280.59 0.22 2859.62 1718 FAO
Cereals3 1619.61 3524.25 0.11 30209.00 1634
Pulses3 135.02 336.87 0.05 3422.25 1550
Vegetables3 403.74 1119.72 0.40 11846.48 1676
Fruits3 670.15 1420.86 1.13 11212.06 1718
Tea4 23990.32 62985.11 11 424334 528
Coffee4 36812.77 69749.48 8 408257 1011
Temperature 24.21 4.15 6.51 29.39 1640 CRU 3.1
Precipitation 81.71 52.28 4.17 257.6 1640
Notes: 1 in million USD. 2 in millions. 3 production in 1,000 tonnes. 4 gross production
values in 1,000 international dollars. VA: value added.
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Figure 1: GDP
N: 22
RMSPE: 0.0584
D: 1
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Notes: Normalized GDP (=1 for average over 1991-1993) for Rwanda. The solid line displays the actual GDP for Rwanda
after the genocide. The dashed line represents the counterfactual (synthetic) GDP for Rwanda based on the synthetic control
method. The numbers below these lines display the estimated yearly treatment effects in percent and the probabilities to
assess the statistical significance of these effects in parenthesis. The country weights for the synthetic Rwanda are: Cameroon
(0.254), Republic of the Congo (0.061), Gabon (0.149), Liberia (0.032), Lesotho (0.192), Mali (0.016), Niger (0.108), Sudan
(0.014), and Senegal (0.175). These weights are based on normalized GDP for odd years up to 1993, the 5 year average
(1985-1990) of GDP in levels, and the additional predictors discussed in Section 3.
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Figure 2: Placebo Studies for GDP
−
1
−
.
5
0
.
5
1
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year
0
.
5
1
1.
5
2
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Year
Note: The left graph shows the results of the placebo studies with the gap between the actual GDP and the synthetic GDP,
i.e., (actual GDP-synthetic GDP)/(synthetic GDP), depicted on the vertical axis. To minimize the influence of outliers, we
applied the rule as described in section 2. The solid line indicates the gap for Rwanda whereas the dashed lines the results
for the placebo studies. The right graph show the placebo in time for GDP. The placebo treatment year is 1985.
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Figure 3: Value added in agriculture
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Notes: Normalized value added in agriculture (=1 for average over 1991-1993) for Rwanda. The solid line displays the
actual value added for Rwanda after the genocide. The dashed line represents the counterfactual (synthetic) value added
for Rwanda based on the synthetic control method. The numbers below these lines display the estimated yearly treatment
effects in percent and the probabilities to assess the statistical significance of these effects in parenthesis. The country
weights for the synthetic Rwanda are: Ivory Coast (0.258), Gambia (0.354), Lesotho (0.123), and Senegal (0.165). These
weights are based on normalized value added for odd years up to 1993, the 5 year average (1985-1990) of value added in
levels, and the additional predictors discussed in Section 3.
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Figure 4: Value added in industry
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Notes: Normalized value added in industry (=1 for average over 1991-1993) for Rwanda. The solid line displays the actual
value added for Rwanda after the genocide. The dashed line represents the counterfactual (synthetic) value added for
Rwanda based on the synthetic control method. The numbers below these lines display the estimated yearly treatment
effects in percent and the probabilities to assess the statistical significance of these effects in parenthesis. The country
weights for the synthetic Rwanda are: Republic of the Congo (0.158), Togo (0.654), South Africa (0.169), and Zambia
(0.019). These weights are based on normalized value added for odd years up to 1993, the 5 year average (1985-1990) of
value added in levels, and the additional predictors discussed in Section 3.
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Figure 5: Value added in services
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Notes: Normalized value added in services (=1 for average over 1991-1993) for Rwanda. The solid line displays the actual
value added for Rwanda after the genocide. The dashed line represents the counterfactual (synthetic) value added for
Rwanda based on the synthetic control method. The numbers below these lines display the estimated yearly treatment
effects in percent and the probabilities to assess the statistical significance of these effects in parenthesis. The country
weights for the synthetic Rwanda are: Benin (0.126), Botswana (0.139), Mauritania (0.032), Sudan (0.159), and Senegal
(0.544). These weights are based on normalized value added for odd years up to 1993, the 5 year average (1985-1990) of
value added in levels, and the additional predictors discussed in Section 3.
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Appendix
Figure A.1: Population Smoothing
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Notes: Normalized total population (=1 for average over 1990-1993) for Rwanda from PWT 8.0. The solid line displays the
actual development of total population for Rwanda. The dashed line represents the counterfactual (synthetic) development
for Rwanda based on the synthetic control method. This Figure shows how population data included in the Penn World
Tables is smoothed over time. The depicted development is rather smooth with no indication of a drastic event in 1994,
implying that it does not represent the true development in case of the Rwandan genocide. We have checked population
data from other sources including WDI and FAO. Although there are some differences, the general pattern is very similar
to the one shown in this figure.
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Figure A.2: GDP without Cameroon
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Notes: Identical to Figure 1, except that Cameroon has been excluded from the donor pool.
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Figure A.3: Placebo Studies for value added in agriculture, industry, and services
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Notes: The upper graph shows the two types of placebo studies for value added in agriculture. The graphs are therefore
the equivalent to Figure 2 for GDP. Likewise, the middle and lower graphs show the placebos studies for value added in
industry and services, respectively. See Figure 2 for further details.
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Figure A.4: Production Values for Tea and Coffee
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N: 16
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Notes: The Figure shows results for normalized gross production value (=1 for average over 1991-1993) for tea (left)
and coffee (right). The solid line displays the actual gross production value for Rwanda. The dashed line represents the
counterfactual (synthetic) for Rwanda based on the synthetic control method. The numbers below these lines display the
estimated yearly treatment effects in percent and the probabilities to assess the statistical significance of these effects in
parenthesis. The country weights for the synthetic Rwanda are: Tea: Cameroon (0.467), Kenya (0.093), Mauritius (0.217),
and South Africa (0.222). Coffee: Republic of the Congo (0.061), Kenya (0.439), Malawi (0.247), Sierra Leone (0.089), Togo
(0.026), and Zimbabwe (0.137). In addition to several years of normalized production value, we also use several years of
temperature and precipitation data, and the count variable for civil conflicts for coffee. The reason for not including more
predictors is the limited data availability. Given the large number of missing observation for each of the variables (outcome
of interest and predictors), each additional predictor decreases the number of countries in the donor pool. Even by using
this very restrictive set of predictors, we are already down to six countries in the donor pool in case of tea.
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